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The Church and its Responsibility to Foster Knowledge
Michael J. Buckley, SJ

Father Greeley has given an insightful and eloquent
appeal for reflection upon things Catholic-for a retrieval
within the Catholic universities of the richness of the
Catholic symbolic experience. I can only second his appeal. But the task that Alice Callin and Tim O'Meara have
assigned me bears upon a different question, one that Mr.
O'Meara framed in this manner: Should the church foster
learning that is on the face of it secular? More specifically,
should the church encourage, yes, even nurture as part of
its own mission research into the physical and biological
sciences? This question could obviously be extended further-into the social sciences, the professions of law, business, and medicine, even the humanities-but 45 minutes
demands that I limit my compass. Father Greeley has
argued the thesis that the Catholic university must foster
things Catholic. Mr. O'Meara's question comes almost by
way of complementary counterpoint: Should the church
as such be vitally engaged in the knowledge that is neither
intrinsically Catholic nor immediately religious?

that creation is a gift? Does this sense of gift not mean
that we should pay attention-even in the most disciplined and serious manner-to what God has
entrusted to us? 2 Has not the church insisted since the
attack of Manichaeism that the world is good and that
matter and history are the stuff of salvation? Does not
creation give obvious importance and even a religious
dimension to the work of science? And has all of this
not been repeated a thousand times!
Let me counter with agreement and disagreement.
There is something generically true about such a
response-but that constitutes its fa tal flaw and the easy
deceptiveness about the response. It offers us a comfortable journey down what RS. Crane called "the high
priori road"; i.e., assuming the relevance and authority
of theoretic doctrines prior to the examination of concrete issues and evidence. 3 It does explain why Christianity has exhibited a pervasive sympathy for nature
and for the disciplines with which it is explored. But this
explanation remains at a level so abstract that it does not
touch our actual issues as they have emerged in the
crises within history, nor does it reach the level of obligation- "should the church"-at which our question has
been posed. To be satisfied with it is to be informed by
neither recent history nor current concrete Catholic
practice.
Can any Catholic recall without blushing, for example,
the papal brief on Darwinism: "A system," wrote Pius
IX, "which is repugnant at once to history, to the tradition of all peoples, to exact science, to observed facts, and
even to reason herself would seem to need no refutation,
did not alienation from God and the leaning to
materialism, due to depravity, eagerly seek support in
all this tissue of fables." 4 Does not the same shame rise
when one recalls that the works of Copernicus and
Galileo remained on the Index of Forbidden Books into the
nineteenth century? Can we not remember that the
volumes of Teilhard de Chardin were ordered removed
from the shelves of Catholic libraries within our own
life-time? All of this is common knowledge, so common
that it undermines something of the credibility of the
church and feeds the extravagant myth of an inherent
antagonism between science and religion. Each year

I. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE
QUESTION
Let me spend some initial moments in specifying this
question. Mr. O'Meara has not asked if the Catholic
university precisely as a university should foster the
physical and biological sciences. The answer to such a
question would be obvious-if the institution wishes to
be a university. Rather the issue is whether the church,
precisely as such, should foster these sciences. Is there
something about the nature and mission of the Christian
community that underscores those obligations incumbent upon the university as such, something about the
church which uniquely supports the common responsibilities of higher education and which would give
added meaning and warrant to the remarkable proposition of the present pope that the church needs the
.
. 1
umvers1ty.
But is the answer to such a question not a banality? Do
not the dogmatic commitments of the church emphasize
Father Buckley is professor of philosophy, theologi;, and of the his/on; and
philosophy of science at the University of Notre Da me
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secular counterparts with the efforts of American
universities to deny the dangerous doctrines of Professor Shockley a hearing or with the unspoken demand
for politically correct opinions, or with the es tablishment as departmental orthodoxies a particular version of analytic philosophy or literary criticism, or with
the prolonged unwillingness even to entertain the
original theories of Alfred Wegener about plate tectonics. The problem is a profoundly human one, not
exclusively an ecclesial one. But our ecclesial history
does furnish added weight to our question: Should the
church as such encourage and foster all genuine and
ethical scientific inquiry no matter where it seems to be
tending? I say "ethical" deliberately because I am concerned in these remarks with dogmatic compatibility,
not with the more technological uses or experimental
inquiries of science that raise serious questions of
morality and ethics.
But our question is sharpened still further if we consider the present attacks on science within American
higher education, attacks that issue from the challenge
of deconstructionism, that are mounted in the name of
egalitarian leveling of all "logocentric hierarchies," that
are embodied in what is present and what is omitted in
the current university conflicts over a canon of appropriate texts or the content of a core curriculum.6 All
of this makes Mr. O'Meara' s question more real: Why
should the church, even before pockets of academic
indifference or hostility, encourage and support a passion for scientific inquiry?

freshmen courses in Western Civilization retrace something of this path laid by some religious leadership. But
not just freshmen! Are Catholic university presidents
unaware that at the very end of the last century, the first
president of Cornell University, Andrew Dickson White
[1832-1918], compiled case after case of such repression
in his massive 1896 work A History of the Warfare of

Science with Theology in Christendom?
Science in abstracto and science in the day-by-daythe church has a long history of positive affirmations
ranging from benignity to significant assist; but the great
revolutionary changes in science have sometimes met
misunderstanding, resistance, and even repressionnot just by church leaders, but by theologians and
manualists. Perhaps the key here is "misunderstanding." These moments were often the result not of viciousness or politics-though this could not be
extended to the Galileo fiasco-but to an intractable
narrowness, an ignorant misreading, a positive
paranoia before novelties which were equated with
threat: "Nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est," was
easily extended to the constitution of the world and the
nature of its origins. But here the paradox becomes
more acute. The heliocentric universe was condemned
by some theologians and ecclesiastic authorities not because they failed to understand Copernicus, Kepler or
Nev rton, but because they failed to understand the Book
of }'ldges or the accommodation principles of Thomas
Aquinas. Fear arose about evolution because ecclesiastics like Henry Edward Cardinal Manning judged it "a
brutal philosof?hy-to wit, there is no God, and the ape
is our Adam." 5 It was often a decadent theology and
barren philosophy that constructed these artificial antinomies or which failed to mediate between the gospel
and the developing culture. Here, as often as not, the
issue lay not so much with the new sciences as with a
theologically sound understanding of the basic
patrimony of the church that alone could make novelties
welcome and mediation possible.
So the question-if it is not to be a banality-can be
honed more precisely. Should the church, as such,
foster science, science even at its most inventive moments, science when its conclusions seem raw or when
it opens a frontier that seems to contradict what has been
accepted even as dogma, when a synthesis has not been
made between faith and science in this new area of
inquiry? It is not simply obvious that the church should
foster such knowledge. Nor is it simply regressive to see
it undermining the belief of ordinary Catholics. In pursuit of its responsibilities, church authority has looked
at the concrete effects of such knowledge and sometimes
inhibited such research and teaching as "confusing the
faithful."
But one need not become unfair or hysterical over this
history. The church has contributed enough encouragement to science in general during these centuries, and
the caution that ecclesiastics have exhibited can find its

II. THESIS 1
As a response, I should like to advance two theses: (1)
In one way or another, contemporary scientific inquiry
raises serious questions about ultimacies and so constitutes part of the present religious problematic; (2) The
scientific passion for the truth about the world is a part
of that general passion for truth that makes faith-any
vital faith-possible. One of my theses deals with
science as a body of knowledge, as a content; the other
deals with it as a method or procedure and a habit of
mind. Let me explore each of them in the time that has
been allotted to me.
Over the past 30 years, the relationship between the
physical sciences and the religious dimensions of life has
radically altered. One can better assess this sea-change
if it is seen in contrast with the intellectual settlements
between science and religion since the dawn of modernity. Drawing these intellectual covenants in very
broad brush strokes, I would su ggest that these centuries have seen four significantly different rela tionships: subsumption, separation or isola tion, alienation,
and correlation. Let me say a shamefull y brief paragraph
to illustrate each.
Subsumption: In the 17th and 18th centuries, natural
philosophy or physics or experimental science was sub-
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and alienation and-because of our ignorance of history-were indoctrinated easily to talk about the "ancient" battle between science and religious.
But within our lifetime, this settlement has begun to
give way before an unexpected development. Increasingly, scientists such as P.W. Atkins, Robert K. Adair,
and Harald Fritzsch find themselves in basic agreement
with the theoretical physicist, Paul W. Davies: "Right or
wrong, the fact that science has actually advanced to the
point where what were formerly religious questions can
be seriously tackled itself indicates the far-reaching consequences of the new physics." In fact, Davies claims
quite flatly: "It may seem bizarre, but in my o~inion,
science offers a surer path to God than religion."
This is no place to survey the evidence that Davies and
others mount, but this much must be said. The way the
contemporary world reveals itself in its fundamental
constitution and origins poses or suggests enormous
questions of ultimacy, even if (pace Davies) it does not
answer them. This is neither unprecedented nor extraordinary; what is extraordinary is the growing recognition
that this is the case. Any human situation, explored with
careful discipline and examined in depth, raises questions of ultimacy for which the methodology at hand is
unequipped. This can occur in two ways: First, it discloses problems about its own foundations, about the
validity of its own presuppositions, the reference claims
that can be made for its axiomatic sets, its postulates, and
finally its relationship to other kinds of knowledge.
Second, a thorough scientific inquiry may well establish
conclusions which themselves raise further questions or
hint toward further knowledge which its own methodology cannot responsibly treat. Such an inquiry may suggest possibilities about the universe which it cannot
responsibly explore. It has classically been the function
of metaphysics to deal with the first of these sets of
problems; i.e., to inquire into the foundations of science
and of mathematics and into the relationship of one area
of knowledge with another. But is it the second inevitable development of scientific knowledge, the questions about ultimacy and about rec.eding horizons that
it raises, which inevitably involves the interest of
religion. For religion, or the disciplined reflection upon
religious experience that we can call theology, is essentially about the ultimacies, the absolutes that impinge
upon human existence and that elicit a possibility of the
world embodying m ysteriou sly the personal interchange between the divine and human.
Let me give one example: If one looks at the fundamental constants of nature, one comes to see the
universe as breath-takingly, unimaginably finely tuned.
For example, as Stephen Hawking has written, if "the
rate of expansion one second after the Big Bang had been
smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million
million, it (the material universe) would have recollapsed before it reached its present size." If, on the other
hand, the rate of expansion had been ever so slightly

sumed as the foundation for religion, most specifically
for the assertion of the existence of God. Certainly this
was the interest that drove much of Isaac Newton, but
one can also find it at the concerns of such scientific
giants as Robert Boyle and John Ray and in the resultant
physicotheologies of William Derham and William
Paley. The evidence from physics became those of
geometrical design and functional subservience, and the
mathematics embedded in the universe pointed to a
universal geometer. Foundational religious reflection
often looked to science for its warrant to assert its fundamental assertions about God.
Separation: Under Laplace and Lagrange, physics and
astronomy freed themselves from furnishing the foundations for religious assertions. William Herschel
recorded the conversation between Napoleon, then first
consul of France, with M. de Laplace on August 8, 1802.
The subject was the sidereal heavens, and Napoleon
asked in a tone of admiration: "And who is the author
of all of this?" Laplace maintained that a series of natural
causes could account for this phenomenon. "This, the
First Consul rather opposed." The story has been
simplified by having Laplace respond to Napoleon with
the celebrated retort: "I have no need of that hypothesis°,"
and then maintaining that Laplace's astronomy was
atheistic. That interpretation is false. Laplace is simply
saying, in opposition to Newton's System of the World and
to the "Queries" at the end of Newton's Optics, that
science was self-contained, that it would not furnish the
basis for religion.7 The new settlement was to be between two distinct, isolated, and methodologically indifferent fields.
Alienation: In the 19th century, the evolutionary
theories of Darwin and Wallace were read as eliminating
both the classic argument from design as well as a special place for human consciousness, a consciousness that
both philosophers and theologians had made integral
for the establishment of the existence of God. Many
religious leaders and scientists read this development as
a fundamental change in the relationship between
science and religion; i.e., as an attack and contradiction.
With such rare exceptions as John Henry Newman, they
understood it basically as threat. Cardinal Wiseman
received permission from the Holy See to found an
academia, one to which he summoned the faithful of
England in these words: "Now it is for the Church which
alone possesses divine certainty and divine discernment, to place itself at once in the front of a movement
which threatens even the fragmentary remains of Christian belief in England." In his Terry Lectures, John
Dewey in the United States announced that religious
belief with any supernatural content could not survive
before the surge in the empirical sciences. During the
important Solvay Conference of 1927, Dirac and Pauli
expressed amazement to Heisenberg that Einstein could
evince any respect for religious consciousness.8 Our
own generations grew up in that atmosphere of hostility
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about our world and about our lives. The church can and
must encourage the advance of this knowledge, confident that the reach of the mind will extend into a
profoundly religious dimension-that questions will be
elicited that the science or the discipline itself cannot
resolve. For science in so many different ways mediates
the world to religious consciousness. As that world
becomes progressively engaged-whether in molecular
biology or astrophysics or cosmology or quantum
mechanics, it will raise issues not merely about the social
and ethical implications of what is discovered-matters
of enormous moral interest to the church-but about the
meaning or purpose in the universe, the pervasiveness
of matter, the eschatological destiny of all that we know.
The church must foster science as a body of knowledge
because it must engage the religious dimensions of this
selfdisclosure of the world. For such a disclosure through
its questions evokes new insights into the significance of
the gospel and the concrete meaning of the One in w horn
and through whom and for whom all things were
made.11
We advance in our understanding of the unique Christological significance of salvation as we understand the
world to which Christ is the immeasurable response-as
He is seen to respond to the questions that the physical
universe and human life pose about existence and
meaning.
Understood in this way, science forms part of the
problematic situation for contemporary theology. If the
church wants the m ystery that it bears taken seriously
and if it wants to come to deeper understanding of this
mystery itself, then the church must foster all those
human engagements in which ultimate questions are
uncovered in depth and presented with urgency and
which cry out for a religious transposition and theological reflection. If, on the other hand, the church ignores
these developments-and how many members of CTSA
or of your theology departments have anything that
could qualify as scientific literacy?-then theology loses
the vitality that this contact with culture can uniquely
offer. One can advance this first thesis slightly further:
If one really understands only the answer itself when
one has grasped the question-if the response becomes
clear only as one sees something of wha t is its fundamental question, then one can ask the church and its
theologians how much they understand about the
gospel (i.e., the recapitulation of all things in Christ)
when they do not see or understand so much of the
world to which it is response and good news.
That is the first thesis I wish to defend: The church
must encourage or foster science because science done
with integrity constitutes something of the problematic
situation which confronts the reflection, yes, even the
self-understanding of the church.

greater, the expansion would have been too great for
stars and planets to form. The universe would have been
impossible. 10 That fine-tuning can be found in such
fundamentals as the mass of the electron, the strength of
the strong nuclear force, the relationship between matter and anti-matter. This number of such "remarkable
coincidences" can admittedly be advanced indefinitely.
Some are using these data, as did Boyle and Newton
to establish an argument for the existence of God. This
seems to me misguided. But what I do think is legitimate
-not to say hypnotizing-is that at the very minimum
they raise the question about purpose and personality
in the universe. Such evidence gives a new basis, a new
plausibility to the question: Is there then mind and
purpose, even a care for human beings, at the basis of
our existence?
Now the reaction to this kind of knowledge or recognition among theologians and thinkers within the
church has been threefold. The vast majority, knowing
nothing about science, wary, suspicious or at best
respecting it at a great remove, are ignorant of these
developments or of their enormous importance in our
understanding of the world. Consequently, they cannot
appropriate the character or the contours of thi s
problematic situation that contemporary culture is
framing for religious inquiry and responses. The
second, enthusiastic about this new knowledge, join
tho~e scientists who enlist these data to ground religious
affirrnations about the existence and nature of God. This
seen.s to me a categorical error, one that mingles different kinds of knowledge and repeats the errors of the
seventeenth century. But the third reaction has been to
treat this new knowledge in one field as constituting a
set of problems, questions leveled at religion. The cosmological constants-the emergence of life, the appearance of consciousness, expansive if not directional
evolution-raise the possibility of profound purpose in
this universe of some eighteen billion years.
This raises in a very different way the question of
God-in a new and newly very plausible way. Does not
the church which talks about God and Christ, even the
cosmic Christ, about providence and salvation, have a
way of taking up these issues, transposing them into
properly theological questions and in terms of theological methodologies and evidence,dealing with these in a
way that the physical sciences cannot? It is consequent
upon the mission of the church that it foster, encourage,
and be in vital contact with scientific inquiry not because
science will answer the questions of religion, but because it poses some of them.
For in scientific inquiry, the world progressively discloses itself. Theological research, investigation, and instruction will only be as vital as the questions they
address. These questions will possess vitality to the
degree that they emerge out of life. Science easily constitutes one of the greatest and most continual efforts of
the human intellect to push to its ultimate what we know
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III. THESIS 2

to cognoscitive rigor, nor does it constitute a voluntaristic sacrificium intellectus. "One would not believe if
she/he did not see that these things were to be believed"
[II-II.1.4. ad 2]. You believe something because you
believe someone; and you believe someone because you
believe that he/she speaks the truth. The grace of faith,
he says very simply, "makes one see the things that are
believed" [II-II.1.4. ad 3]. The content of your faith and
the source of your faith are conditioned by this absolute
or primary commitment-an uncompromising, non-negotiable commitment to the truth: "nothing can fall
under faith except so far as it stands under the first
truth" [II.II.1.3] . It is in this way that faith does not
contradict intellectual activity, but "brings understanding to its completion" [II-II.1.3. ad 1]. Only this
commitment to truth can make authentic faith possible:
both the commitment of God to its revelation and the
12
surrender of a human being to its absolute primacy.
I suggest that under that seemingly dry proposition of
Aquinas he is proposing an understanding of Catholic
faith that makes the church's encouragement of zealous,
self-sacrificing science a matter of crucial moment. To
evoke authentic faith, the church must foster in every
possible way an uncompromising commitment to the
truth, in whatever way it discloses itself. The Christian
community must give itself to build a world in which
truth is explored, disclosed, and spoken. The church
itself must be understood- or come to be more vitallythe place where truth is reverenced and demanded and
spoken. For this openness to the real-whether one of
physical nature or of mathematical coherence or ofbiological and human nature-this acceptance of what is simply because it is is a fundamental condition for the
possibility of Christian faith. As this disposition
dominates the scientific mind-and the church must
encourage it to be faithful to itself-as it governs and
directs a person's entire career, as it permeates teaching
and drives research through difficult, discouraging and
dogged moments, as it works against the vices and the
narrowness that make for dishonesty and pretense, as it
counters a defensive unwillingness to face up to the way
things are, such a disposition develops in the mind those
habits which are essential if faith is to be authentic. For
the finest reaches of the scientific mind lie in an undeviating determination towards the truth; and from the
time of Paul it has been said that the failure in faith is
basically a "failure to love the truth and be saved" [2
Thes 2:10].
It is of vital importance that the church encourage,
demand, propose, or foster every serious engagement
by which human dedication and its consequent effort
engage itself with an enterprise whose purpose is truth.
And what must the church ask at those crisis-moments when scientific inquiry and dogmatic assertion
seem to clash, when they even appear to contradict?
That both continue their inquiries or experiments, their
discussions and reconsideration without impediment or

May I now use the time I still have available to advance
a second thesis. Here I do not intend to deal with science
as an expanding body of knowledge, but as a habit of
mind issuing in a methodologically selfconscious, exact
and demanding exploration of the world in order to
determine what is true about it. I take it that this is the
purpose of science, no matter how different and no
matter how instrumental may be its best available conclusions. I take it that this is where the almost hypnotic
appeal of the scientific enterprise lies, whether its effort
be bent on solving problems of tensor calculus or building a multibillion-dollar super-conducting supercollider, whether it be purely theoretic in its interests in
subatomic physics or technologically oriented towards
global warming and space stations. There can be an
addictive appeal in learning what is the case, what is the
solution to a problem, what is the truth about things.
This dedication constitutes the scientific mind at its
finest. Not just the scientific mind, of course, but the
scientific habit is one generic form of this dedication, one
of its strongest forms in contemporary culture.
I am as aware as you of the vanity and the vicious
competition, of the ego-investments and financial greed
that can and has entered into this world. But there is at
its best-a best which the church must encourage and
reverence-there is a grandeur, a purity of heart, a selftranscendence that the scientific mind calls for, a
profound orientation towards the truth. In this orientation, it seems to me, one encounters the absolute; i.e., that
which is directive and normative of all life and is itself
not governed or subject or relative or dependent upon
anything else. This may not necessarily emerge in the
conclusions of the work of the scientist, but the decencies
of his or her calling dictate that it be always operative in
the uncompromising claim that truth makes upon the
direction that this work takes. Truth is both the horizon
towards which the scientist moves and the imperative
that directs her or his choices. The scientist, as a scientist,
is called upon to explore what is the case in as imaginative and as disciplined a form as possible and to tell the
truth that his research discloses with a disciplined exactitude.
Now, in order to focus my argument at this point, I
should like to direct your attention to what may seem a
very dry and inconsequential proposition in Thomistic
theology. It is the very first issue that Aquinas raises
when he deals with faith. He asks this question: What is
the formal object of faith? In other words, what is the
indispensable aspect under which you must see what
you are asked to believe, that aspect by which something
becomes credible and which entails the inescapable
commitment for making an act of faith? And he answers
this very simply. The formal object of faith is the
primary, the absolute truth [II-II.1.1] . Christian faith for
Aquinas is not a blind leap in the dark; it is not opposed
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mutual condemnation, as Cardinal Newman wrote,
"with full faith in the consistency of that multiform
truth, which they share between them, in a generous
confidence that they will be ultimately consistent, one
and all, in their combined results though there may be
momentary collisions, awkward appearances and many
.
" 13
.
. o f contranety.
foreb od mgs
and prop h ec1es
In my opinion, one could argue even further that this
costly love for truth is not only a disposition for faith but
as it becomes absolute and universal constitutes that
universal surrender which Karl Rahner has signaled as
transcendental faith: the obedient acceptance of God
revealing Himself as the all-guiding, all-governing
truth, permeating all things, giving meaning and urgency to its smallest participation and confronting one continually in a relationship of absolute closeness and
summons. The day-by-day honest drudgery of science

could well constitute the categorical mediation of such
transcendental revelation and its responding faith. 14

IV. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to answer Tim O'Meara's question
with the two theses that these pages have only been able
to outline. Each of them needs more development and
nuance, but the basic point is this: The church must
encourage scientific inquiry as it must care for the sources of its own vitality. It must both foster an undeviating
determination for the truth wherever this occurs as the
only matrix out of which Christian faith can emerge, and
it must further those disciplined inquiries whose natural
d ynamism develops into those profound questions or
suggestions about ultimacy that constitute the religious
dimensions of life and reach towards the unspeakable
mystery that is God.
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